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Abstract
Human perception of ambiguous sensory signals is biased by prior experiences. It is not known how such prior information
is encoded, retrieved and combined with sensory information by neurons. Previous authors have suggested dynamic
encoding mechanisms for prior information, whereby top-down modulation of firing patterns on a trial-by-trial basis creates
short-term representations of priors. Although such a mechanism may well account for perceptual bias arising in the short-
term, it does not account for the often irreversible and robust changes in perception that result from long-term,
developmental experience. Based on the finding that more frequently experienced stimuli gain greater representations in
sensory cortices during development, we reasoned that prior information could be stored in the size of cortical sensory
representations. For the case of auditory perception, we use a computational model to show that prior information about
sound frequency distributions may be stored in the size of primary auditory cortex frequency representations, read-out by
elevated baseline activity in all neurons and combined with sensory-evoked activity to generate a percept that conforms to
Bayesian integration theory. Our results suggest an alternative neural mechanism for experience-induced long-term
perceptual bias in the context of auditory perception. They make the testable prediction that the extent of such perceptual
prior bias is modulated by both the degree of cortical reorganization and the magnitude of spontaneous activity in primary
auditory cortex. Given that cortical over-representation of frequently experienced stimuli, as well as perceptual bias towards
such stimuli is a common phenomenon across sensory modalities, our model may generalize to sensory perception, rather
than being specific to auditory perception.
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Introduction
Natural stimuli are variable and often mixed with noise. Our
perception of these stimuli is thus derived from ambiguous sensory
inputs. Psychophysical experiments in humans and primates
indicate that this ambiguity is partly compensated for by
incorporating information about the probabilities of previously
experienced stimuli directly into the percept in a Bayesian manner
[1–3]. However, it is not known how this prior information is
encoded, retrieved and combined with sensory information by
neurons [4,5].
Previous theoretical investigations of Bayesian inference were
often based on homogeneous stimulus representations—i.e., all
possible values of stimulus parameters are evenly represented [5].
In such a representational system, prior information is typically
modeled as the activation of a sub-population of neurons by top-
down influences or cross-modal interactions [5,6]. This population
activity may be linearly combined with sensory-driven activity for
optimal integration of information [5]. These prior storage and
integration processes are believed to occur in higher-level/multi-
sensory cortical areas, but not in low-level sensory cortices.
Although such a mechanism of dynamic prior information
encoding and integration may underlie perceptual bias arising in
the short-term and in a context-dependent manner [1], it does not
account for the often irreversible, robust and context-independent
changes in perception that result from long-term, developmental
experience [7,8]. Extensive experience of native speech sounds, for
instance, warps the perceptual space so that speech sound variants
near a frequently heard prototype are perceived as being more
similar to the prototype than they actually are [8,9]. Such a
phenomenon, also known as the perceptual magnet effect, has
been interpreted as an example of Bayesian inference in language
perception [3], and has been correlated with experience-altered
stimulus representations in the sensory cortices [7,10].
Cortical stimulus representations are not homogeneous. Sensory
experience during early development results in robust changes in
primary cortical sensory representations that persist into adult-
hood. A very consistent finding is that more frequently
experienced stimuli gain greater representations in primary
sensory cortices [7]. The influences of inhomogeneous represen-
tations on sensory perception have not been fully explored. We
reasoned that the sizes of cortical stimulus representations carry
long-term prior information [11], and could play an important
role in Bayesian inference in sensory perception. Using a
computational model of auditory perception, we investigated the
effect of increasing cortical frequency representations on the
perception of pure tones. The results indicate that prior
information stored in primary auditory cortex frequency repre-
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 May 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 5 | e10497sentations can be read-out by locally generated neuronal activity
and combined with sensory-evoked activity to generate a percept
that conforms to Bayesian integration theory.
Materials and Methods
Modeling frequency representations in AI
We modeled primary auditory cortex (AI) frequency representa-
tions with 800 independent Poisson-firing neurons. The parameters
of the model werechosen based on properties of the primary auditory
cortical neurons documented in the literature and our unpublished
results. In particular, our experimental finding that the firing rates of
neurons in auditory cortex exhibit significant variability, with a mean
Fano factor value of 0.98+/20.21 [12], led us to model neuronal
firing as a Poisson process. Each neuron had a Gaussian-shaped
response-frequency tuning curve as:
Ti f ðÞ ~ae
{(frequency{m)2
2s f ðÞ 2 zd ð1Þ
where m is the characteristic frequency, a is the maximum response
magnitude, 2s is the tuning bandwidth and d is the baseline
spontaneous firing rate. The distributions of tuning bandwidths (2s)
and maximum response magnitudes (a) are approximately lognormal,
and based directly on our experimental observations. Lognormal
distribution is characterized by two parameters—the mean and
standard deviation of the logarithm of the investigated response
property. The baseline spontaneous firing magnitudes exhibit an
exponential distribution, which is characterizedbya population mean.
The tuning bandwidths, maximum response magnitudes and baseline
spontaneous firing magnitudes of the model AI neurons were
independently and randomly drawn from the corresponding
distributions.TheparametersofthedistributionsarelistedinTable1.
To replicate frequency representations seen in AI of naı ¨ve
animals and animals with extensive prior experience of a specific
tone (7 kHz) [7], model characteristic frequencies (CFs) were
either uniformly distributed on a logarithmic scale in the range of
1–32 kHz (naı ¨ve) or skewed such that more neurons were tuned to
7kHz (7-kHz-over-represented) (Fig. 1). For the 7kHz-over-
represented AI, CFs from 5 to 10 kHz were shifted to have a
Gaussian distribution centered at 7kHz and with a standard
deviation of 0.1 octave (Fig. 1). Consistent with our experimental
findings the bandwidths of neurons in the over-represented range
were slightly smaller (Table 1) [7].
Modeling frequency perception
We modeled auditory perception by decoding the simulated
population response to an input frequency using the maximum-
likelihood decoding method [7,12,13]. Assume that, when stimu-
lated with a tone of frequency f, the ith neuron of the model AI
responds with Rstimi spikes. As the model neurons fire spikes in a
Poisson-random fashion, Rstimi is a Poisson-random number with
a mean ofTi(f), whereTi is the neuron’sresponse-frequency tuning
curve. The probability of the neuron responding to f with Rstimi is
P RstimiDf ðÞ ~
Ti f ðÞ
Rstimi
Rstimi!
e{Ti f ðÞ ð2Þ
The stimulus likelihood distribution derived from the population
response Rstim of all N model neurons (1, 2, … N) is:
Lf jRstim ðÞ ~P Rstimjf ðÞ ~PP Rstimijf ðÞ
~P
Ti f ðÞ
Rstimi
Rstimi!
e{Ti f ðÞ
ð3Þ
When given the population response to an unknown frequency f,
we can calculate the maximum-likelihood estimate of f, denoted as
F, by maximizing the following log-likelihood function [13,14],
using a sequential quadratic programming method [15],
lnLF ðÞ ~
X N
i~1
lnLi F ðÞ ~
X N
i~1
lnPR ijF ðÞ
~
X N
i~1
ln
Ti F ðÞ
Ri
Ri!
e{Ti F ðÞ
 !
~
X N
i~1
Ri lnTi F ðÞ {
X N
i~1
Ti F ðÞ {
X N
i~1
ln Ri! ðÞ
ð4Þ
where Ri is the response of the ith neuron and in this case refers to
Rstimi (however, see below).
Modeling Bayesian integration. According to Bayesian integration
theory, frequency perception depends both on prior-based expecta-
tionandsensoryinput[1,3,16].Inordertoreturnanoptimalstimulus
estimate, the probability distributions representing each quantity
should be combined according to Bayes’ rule [1]. The stimulus
probability derived from the sensory stimulus-evoked responses
Rstim is the frequency likelihood Lf DRstim ðÞ ~P RstimDf ðÞ .H e r e
we explore the idea that prior probability is read out from the
frequency representation by elevated spontaneous activity Rspont
across the whole population of neurons: Lf DRspont ðÞ ~
P RspontDf ðÞ . It is important to distinguish Rspont from d,a si n
contrast to d, which is part of the neuron’s tuning curve and used in
the maximum likelihood algorithm, Rspont represents elevated
spontaneous activity that the maximum likelihood decoder is not
aware of.
We therefore modeled Bayesian integration of sensory input and
prior-based expectation by calculating the stimulus likelihood function
derived from the linear superposition of stimulus-evoked activity and
elevated spontaneous activity (Rspont and Rstim)(Fig. 2c).
Lf jRstimzRspont ðÞ ~P RstimzRspontjf ðÞ
!Lf jRstim ðÞ Lf jRspont ðÞ e
{
P N
i~1
Ti F ðÞ
ð5Þ
Table 1. Distribution parameters of neuronal response
properties.
Properties Groups Mean SD
Log-bandwidth Control 20.7528 0.4727
7-kHz, BFs of 7 kHz60.3
octave
20.8723 0.2837
7-kHz, other BFs 20.6359 0.4583
Log-response magnitude Control 20.1815 0.5562
7-kHz 20.1774 0.5711
Baseline Spontaneous firing
magnitude
Control 0.0388 N/A
7-kHz 0.0374 N/A
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010497.t001
Sensory Priors in Cortical Map
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 May 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 5 | e10497When the frequency representation is homogeneous, equation 5 may
be simplified as,
Lf DRstimzRspont ðÞ !Lf DRstim ðÞ Lf DRspont ðÞ : ð6Þ
which is in the form of Bayes rule. With inhomogeneous frequency
representations, there is a small deviation from Bayes rule caused by
an additional term, e
{
P N
i~1
Ti F ðÞ
(see equation 5).
Results
Convergence of maximum-likelihood estimate at the
input stimulus
We first examined model auditory perception with normal levels
of baseline activity for both the naı ¨ve and 7kHz-over-represented
model AIs. The maximum likelihood estimate or ‘percept’
converged at the input frequency for both naı ¨ve and 7kHz-over-
represented model AIs (Fig. 2a, Fig. 3a–b), even for the under-
represented frequencies that no neurons were tuned to. This is not
surprising because primary auditory cortical neurons are broadly
tuned, and responsive to those frequencies. Thus, the maximum-
likelihood estimate of sensory input from population responses is
insensitive to inhomogeneity of sensory representations, and
always converges on the input stimulus.
Readout of prior information by nonselectively elevated
population activity
We reasoned that the readout of long-term, context-independent
priors should not depend on specific patterns of population activity
driven by higher-level inferences. Rather, if information about prior
stimulus distributions is encoded in the size of primary cortical
representations, it should be retrieved by a non-selective increase in
the activity in all neurons. Although such activity may be triggered or
enhanced by task-related top-down influences or neuromodulatory
activity (for example in situations where sensory information is
ambiguous) [6,17], it need not contain specific prior information
itself.Totestthisidea,weincreasedthebaselineactivityofallneurons
to their maximum response magnitude, and examined the stimulus
likelihood distribution in the absence of stimulus-evoked activity
(Fig. 2b). The likelihood function of the naı ¨ve model AI was flat with
nopeaks(datanotshown),whereasthat of the7kHz-over-represented
model AI showed a peak near the over-represented frequency
(Fig. 2b). This peaked likelihood function may be regarded as an
Figure 1. Modeling tonal frequency representations in the
primary auditory cortex. (a, b) Representative tuning curves of the
naı ¨ve (a) and the 7-kHz-over-represented (b) model AI. The histograms
in the lower part of the graphs show distributions of CFs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010497.g001
Figure 2. Neuronal population activity and derived log-
likelihood functions. Left panels show population activity of the
model 7-kHz-over-represented AI, and the right panels show stimulus
log-likelihood functions. (a) Response of the model to a 4-kHz tone pip
(b) Elevated baseline activity in the absence of a stimulus (c) Summed
spontaneous and 4-kHz-evoked activity). Each bar in the left panels
represents the firing rate of a model neuron. The neurons are arranged
by characteristic frequency, with low frequency-tuned neurons on the
left and high frequency-tuned neurons on the right. Blue dotted lines in
the right panels show the input frequency, red dotted lines show the
over-represented frequency, and the black dotted lines mark the peaks
of the log-likelihood functions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010497.g002
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stimulus. In calculating the likelihood function here, we assumed that
the maximum-likelihood decoder was unaware that the elevated
activity was not sensory driven. This is not different from the
treatment of top-down prior-related or cross-modal activity in other
models of Bayesian inference [5] (see Discussion).
Bayesian Integration of prior and sensory information
It has recently been shown that Bayesian integration of
probability distributions represented in neuronal population codes
such as the one used in our model may be achieved by simple
summation of population activities [5]. Stimulus-evoked and
spontaneous activity in primary sensory cortices summates linearly
[18]. When we decoded the summed population response
(consisting of the linear superposition of elevated baseline activity
and 4-kHz-evoked activity [5]), the peak of the likelihood function
was shifted towards 7kHz for the 7kHz-over-represented model
(Fig. 2c, right). Such a shift was observed for frequencies near
7kHz in the 7-kHz-overrepresented (Fig. 3d), but not the naı ¨ve
(Fig. 3c), model AI. This perceptual bias is consistent with
Bayesian integration of prior information and noisy auditory input
[3], and may explain the impaired discrimination ability for
frequencies near over-represented frequencies which has been
recently reported [7].
Decoding variability
The relative decoding variability at the over-represented frequency
range behaves differently with and without the elevated baseline
activity. With an increased baseline, although overall variability is
increased, it is relatively lower for the over-represented frequencies
than for the neighboring frequencies (Fig. 3d). This is consistent with
human psychophysical studies showing that extensively experienced
native speech sounds are perceived with less variability than novel
foreign speech sounds [19].
Influences of neuronal population size and activity levels
on perceptual bias
Some parameters of the model AI, such as the total number of
neurons and the magnitude of the elevated spontaneous firing rate,
were arbitrarily chosen. We therefore systematically varied these
parameters to explore their influence on the observed character-
istic perceptual shift (Fig. 4). The slope of the input-output
function in the over-represented frequency range was used as a
measure of perceptual shift magnitude—smaller slopes indicate
greater prior bias (Fig. 3d). When the magnitudes of the stimulus-
evoked responses were fixed, increasing the level of baseline
activity led to smaller input-output slopes, indicative of stronger
prior biases (Fig. 4a). Similarly, when the ratio of baseline to
evoked responses was set at 1, increasing overall activity also
Figure 3. Decoded frequency as a function of input frequency. Both the naı ¨ve model AI (a and c) and 7-kHz-over-represented AI (b and d)
were examined with (c and d) and without (a and b) elevated baseline activity. In addition, standard deviation of the decoded frequencies (red) was
used to measure the output variability. When baseline activity was elevated in the 7-kHz-over-represented AI, the decoded frequencies show shifts
characteristic of Bayesian prior bias (d). The pink line shows the slope of the input-output curve at the over-represented frequency. The slope is a
measure of the prior bias.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010497.g003
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activity led to higher decoding variability (Fig. 4b), whereas
increasing both baseline and sensory-evoked activity reduced
decoding variability (Fig. 4d). Increasing neuronal population size
reduced this variability. Thus, higher baseline-to-evoked activity
ratio in a larger population of neurons would produce more
reliable and robust prior biases. Optimal integration of prior and
sensory information may be achieved by adjusting the levels of
baseline activity in a task-dependent manner (e.g., higher baseline
activity when the stimulus is more ambiguous).
Discussion
Earlier studies have suggested that dynamic prior information
may be encoded by the activity of a subset of primary cortical
neurons in a homogeneous representational system. The specific
pattern of activity is driven by inputs outside of primary sensory
cortex that carry prior information derived from high-level
inference. Thus the encoding of the prior is separate from its
integration with sensory information and must be mediated by
different neural circuits. The specific brain substrates and
mechanisms for prior encoding and retrieval are unknown. The
present study considered the possibility of storing long-term prior
information in the size of sensory representations. A novel finding
is that in the context of auditory perception, long-term priors
about sound frequency distributions can be retrieved by non-selective
increase in the activity of all neurons in primary auditory cortex. In
the model, the same cortical circuit performs both the encoding
and integration of the prior. The increase in overall activity could
be driven by a general top-down signal without specific prior
information.
In order for optimal Bayesian integration of prior and sensory
information to occur, our model requires that the relative
contributions of prior-related and sensory-evoked activity be
modulated by task conditions on a trial-by-trial basis. In other
words, although the prior is long-term, optimal Bayesian inference
requires that the extent to which it used in generating a sensory
percept depend on task demand and stimulus uncertainty. Our
simulation shows that this could be accomplished by changing
overall levels of activity. Higher levels of overall activity increase
the contribution of prior information to sensory perception and
increase prior bias. Thus our results suggest that in situations
where auditory input is ambiguous, the overall level of activity in
all primary auditory cortex neurons should increase. Although
dynamic prior encoding also calls for a higher level of prior-related
activity when the sensory input is ambiguous, such activity occurs
only in a subset of neurons.
Elevated neuronal activity is not the only way that a prior stored
in the size of sensory representations could be read out. Another
possibility, recently proposed in unpublished work [20], is that the
Figure 4. Influence of neuronal population size, baseline activity level, and overall activity level on sensory decoding. (a and c)
Slopes of the input-output function (see the pink line in Figure 3D), showing the degree of prior bias. (b and d) Standard deviation of the decoded
frequencies, which measures the decoding variability. In a and b, sensory-evoked activity level was fixed and the neuronal population size (color-
coded) and baseline activity level were systematically varied. Baseline activity level refers to the multiplicative factor. For example, baseline activity
level of 2 indicates doubling of activity. In c and d, the ratio of baseline activity to maximum evoked response magnitude was set at 1, and activity
was systematically varied together. Error bars represent SEM, and are mostly masked by the data symbols.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010497.g004
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scheme leads to the same degree of prior bias as our simulation. The
major difference between these two schemes is that in our
simulation the degree of bias is adjustable and dependent on task
conditions rather than being a fixed and inbuilt property of the
decoder. Recent experimental work has suggested that the degree of
bias for long-term priors may be dependent on task conditions [21].
Different levels of intrinsic, ‘‘baseline’’ activity in primary
sensory cortices have been shown to profoundly influence
neuronal responses to sensory stimuli [18,22], sensory perception
[23] and motor behaviors [24]. In our model, the level of
internally driven activity depends on the uncertainty of auditory
input. It remains to be determined how this sensory uncertainty is
encoded and used to optimize performance. Task-related
uncertainty has been shown to modulate baseline activity [6],
possibly by activation of neuromodulatory systems, thereby
influencing the extent to which behavioral responses depend on
internal prior information versus external sensory information
sources [17]. Another possibility is that the background noise that
characterizes ambiguous sensory situations nonspecifically acti-
vates auditory cortex to achieve the same end as elevated
spontaneous activity. However, unlike elevated spontaneous
activity, noise activates neurons in different regions of auditory
cortex differentially [25] and its effects can therefore not be
directly inferred from this study.
Maximum-likelihood estimation is an unbiased feature decoding
method. With a sufficient number of neurons, as well as the
knowledge of which part of the neuronal activity is due to the input
stimulus, its decoding result always converges on the input stimulus
(Fig. 3). In earlier studies of Bayesian integration, top-down prior-
related activity and cross-modal sensory activity were linearly
combined with, and not distinguished from, stimulus driven
activity [5]. Perceptual biases arise out of this treatment of prior-
encoding or cross–modal activity. We treated spontaneous activity
similarly in our simulation – the decoder does not distinguish it
from stimulus driven activity.
Elevating spontaneous activity results in greater decoding
variability in our simulations (Fig. 3). Thus, stimulus-decoding
performance is decreased. However, the increase in spontaneous
activity in our model is caused by task demand when the sensory
input is ambiguous, and cannot be resolved by simple (optimal)
stimulus decoding. It enables integration of prior information to
optimally resolve stimulus ambiguity. Furthermore, decoding
variability decreases rapidly when more neurons are included in
the model (Fig. 4), and therefore may not pose a problem for the
real brain.
Although our model is based on tonal frequency representations
in primary auditory cortex, it should generalize to any stimulus
dimension represented by populations of plastic sensory neurons.
Over-representation of frequently experienced stimuli is a
common feature of primary sensory cortex independent of
modality, and occurs for sound intensity [26], sweep direction
[27], spectral bandwidth [25] and temporal rate [28] in primary
auditory cortex, line orientation [29] in primary visual cortex, and
whisker representation in primary somatosensory cortex [30], to
name a few examples. Maximum likelihood estimation has also
been used to model sensory perception in multiple modalities
[13,14]. Although there are not many explicitly documented
examples of perceptual bias towards long-term priors outside of
the auditory system, recent work in the visual system has shown
that subjects perform a line orientation discrimination task in a
way that suggests bias towards line orientations that occur more
frequently in the environment [31]. Our model may therefore
generalize to sensory perception in general, rather than the specific
case of auditory perception.
In summary, we have shown that long-term prior information in
auditory perception may be stored in the sizes of primary auditory
cortex frequency representations and be read out by non-selective
increases in baseline activity. Such increase in baseline activity
may be controlled by task demand through top-down influences,
and when combined with stimulus-driven activity, allow Bayesian
integration of prior and sensory information. Our model makes
two unique testable predictions independent of sensory modality
that distinguish it from other models of dynamic Bayesian
integration: 1) percepts of ambiguous stimuli are biased toward
stimuli with larger sensory representations; 2) ambiguous sensory
input leads to a non-selective increase in baseline activity of all coding
neurons.
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